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ABSTRACT: Over the last four decades the locus of economic power has shifted from industry to finance. As part 
of this trend, the 'financialisation' of the water sector has added a new layer of complexity to the hydrosocial 
cycle, witnessed in the emergence of new financial actors, logics and financing instruments. Such a shift has 
profoundly reshaped the relationship between water utilities and consumers in the South East of England, where 
the household has become, in the words of Allen and Pryke (2013), a human revenue stream for financialised 
utilities. In this paper, we make an argument that the water meter is one of the crucial mediators through which 
finance will touch the lives of individual subjects. In the South East of England, after initial opposition to universal 
metering – in part shaped by fears over fluctuating revenues – water companies are now embedding a metering 
programme within a billing and tariff structure that aims to ensure governable and predictable subjects. Drawing 
on Urban Political Ecology, we argue that the financialisation of the water sector in England shapes the 
emergence of new financial subjectivities while enabling new forms of political rule that operate at a range of 
spatial scales. 
 
KEYWORDS: Water meters, financialisation, hydrosocial cycle, households, South East England 
INTRODUCTION 
If privatisation debates dominated discussions around water governance throughout the late twentieth 
century, provoking analyses of the relationship between political economic change and the 
deregulation and reregulation of the water sector (Bakker, 2003), a fundamental shift is now apparent. 
Financial actors now exert a profound influence on water governance, and the model that has evolved 
is far removed from the shareholder capitalism around which privatisation originally cohered (Allen and 
Pryke, 2013; Merme et al., 2014). As several authors now recognise, the 'financialisation' of the water 
sector has added a new layer of complexity to the hydrosocial cycle,1 witnessed in the emergence of 
new financial actors, logics, and financing instruments (Bayliss, 2014, 2015; March and Purcell, 2014). In 
parallel, there has been a resurgence of major infrastructure projects (Loftus and March, 2016); the 
                                                          
1
 We take this term from Linton and Budds (2014), among others, who emphasise the socio-natural processes through which 
'society' and 'nature' make and remake one another. Importantly the term emphasises a range of political and social 
considerations shaping what is often considered a nonsocial hydrologic cycle. 
Water Alternatives - 2016  Volume 9 | Issue 2 
Loftus et al.: Water infrastructure and the making of financial subjects Page | 320 
sector has become much more heavily indebted; and as part of a 'twin track' approach, several utilities 
in the South East of England are embarking on a range of different metering programmes. These 
compulsory metering schemes imply both threats and opportunities to financialised utilities. On the 
one hand, stable returns generated through charging households fixed rates for water are threatened 
by the likelihood of bills fluctuating according to varying consumption. Nevertheless, if utilities can be 
protected from short-term volatility in the early years of meter adoption, these metering technologies 
provide opportunities for companies to access far more data on household consumption and, crucially, 
if embedded within a new system of billing, they provide the opportunity for companies to exert 
greater influence over consumer behaviour, thereby better matching stable revenues with future 
demand predictions. If Allen and Pryke (2013) are correct to argue that the household has become a 
human revenue stream within the financialised water sector, it is no longer appropriate for this revenue 
stream to behave in erratic and unpredictable ways. Instead, governable, responsible subjects are 
required. For many of the water utilities operating in England shifts in consumption patterns could 
contribute to wild swings in the water service provider’s credit ratings. Thus, in this paper we argue that 
the financialisation of the water sector increasingly relies on predictable and governable behaviour at 
the household level and on the emergence of new subjectivities in relation to the disciplining 
technology of the water meter and new billing practices. 
Urban Political Ecology (UPE) is situated in a privileged position for shedding light upon the changes 
wrought by financialisation through its focus on the choreographies of power within the water sector, 
as well as its focus on finance’s intermingling with large infrastructures and micro-infrastructures at the 
household level. Similarly, water supply in England provides us with an optimal case through which to 
demonstrate such changes. While some years ago England and Wales were together viewed as one of 
the iconic examples of outright divestiture within the water sector, the English case2 now allows us to 
scrutinise the deep entanglements of financialisation with the hydrosocial cycle. Thus, we draw on UPE 
in order to make sense of the relationship between the emergence of new financial subjectivities in the 
water sector and the political rule of finance. 
The paper is therefore structured as follows. After this brief introduction, we seek to explain why 
UPE is particularly well placed to be able to make sense of the most recent changes within the 
hydrosocial cycle, especially in considering the entrance of new financial actors, instruments, and logics. 
Afterwards, we present an extended review of up-to-date work on the financialisation of the water 
sector before dealing with the specific case of South East England in order to develop our argument 
further. Finally, we conclude with some reflections on the importance of considering financialisation 
within critical research on water service provision, infrastructural form, and political rule. 
URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND FINANCE 
Since its inception, UPE has engaged with the politics of infrastructural provision. Instead of posing a set 
of merely technical questions, in which infrastructure appears as an unquestioned or unproblematic 
backdrop, urban political ecologists have analysed the political achievements of urban infrastructural 
projects (Kaika, 2005). Water infrastructure is shaped by, and shapes, broader cultural, political and 
economic sets of relations (Gandy, 2002). In so doing, UPE has engaged with many of the debates that 
frame this special issue. Thus, Swyngedouw (2015) has addressed the Wittfogelian legacy directly, while 
others have drawn from Graham and Marvin’s (2001) work on Splintering Urbanism to better 
                                                          
2
 We do not consider the Welsh case, given the fact that almost all water provision in Wales was taken over by a not-for-profit 
entity in 2001. Nevertheless, as Zetland (2016) demonstrates, the high customer satisfaction rates of Dwr Cymru/Welsh Water, 
and the entity’s very different approach to metering could provide an important contrast to the trends we cite in this paper. 
We do not consider the Scottish and Northern Irish cases, as these have a different governance system.  
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understand the connections between infrastructure and shifting forms of rule. In order to focus 
attention on the contribution of UPE to theorising forms of political rule, we will briefly consider the 
overall approach. 
UPE is non-canonical. Made up of a diverse set of approaches, its influences are various, its 
inspirations many, and it is perhaps best conceived of as a terrain of debate. For Heynen et al. (2006), 
along with many of the contributors to their definitive volume of essays, key influences on their own 
approach to UPE can be found within Smith’s (1984) quixotic thesis on the production of nature. 
Against "bourgeois ideologies", in which nature is framed as simultaneously universal and external to 
human life, Smith traces an alternative tradition in Marx, thereby claiming that nature is better 
understood as "produced", first as use value, and then, with encroaching capitalist social relations, as 
an exchange value (ibid.). This latter phase in the production of nature marks the entry and circulation 
of a second nature within the web of life (cf Moore, 2015). The production of nature thesis was a crucial 
step in Smith’s reinterpretation of the production of space (and its connection to the survival of 
capitalism), as well as to his understanding of uneven development on both an urban and a global scale. 
For Swyngedouw (1995) the production of nature thesis opens up an understanding of the city as 
neither entirely social nor entirely natural. Analysing the urbanisation of nature thereby demands an 
approach that is attendant to questions of hybridity and that can be captured effectively through the 
figure of the cyborg. Inspiring a range of subsequent research projects, UPE’s focus on cyborg 
urbanisation has enabled scholars to address questions of techno natures (White and Wilbert, 2006), 
the phantasmagoria of urban technological networks (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000), and the 
reification of urban infrastructure provision (Loftus, 2006). Kaika (2005), moreover, has deployed 
Benjamin’s notion of the 'wish image', alongside Marx’s understanding of commodity fetishism, to 
emphasise the neglected power exerted by urban infrastructures over the populations they are 
assumed to serve. 
Although some urban political ecological works have turned to the question of financialisation 
(March and Purcell, 2014; Loftus and March, 2016), this putative shift in capitalist social relations 
remains relatively underexplored when one considers the growing importance of financial actors in the 
provision of a range of services from electricity to water, waste, sewerage and transportation. 
Nevertheless, we would argue that UPE lays the foundations from which a powerful analysis of 
financialised water infrastructure and its internal relationship to forms of political rule might begin to 
emerge. 
First, UPE has been deeply attentive to the changing political economy of water provision through 
linking a critique of political economy to changing forms of political rule and emergent subjectivities. 
Thus, Swyngedouw (2004) makes the provocative claim that the privatisation of water involves the 
transformation of local waters into global money. Furthermore, this transformation involves an act of 
dispossessing populations from their means of existence (Swyngedouw, 2005). For Loftus (2012) new 
technologies become necessary in ensuring that accumulation by dispossession can be reproduced as 
an ongoing process, even in a context (South Africa) in which a constitutional guarantee of the right to 
water appears to undermine such a process. A range of metering technologies therefore proliferated in 
South Africa following the dramatic commercialisation of bulk water provision in the wake of the 
'achievement' of the right to water. Water metering in this instance becomes a 'necessary' measure for 
protecting the fragile revenues of eThekwini Water Services and its commercialised bulk water 
provider, Umgeni Water. For Nash (2013), the enrolment of consumers as participants in the act of 
achieving full cost recovery – in part through ensuring a new role for water meters – represents a scaled 
form of passive revolution (cf. Morton, 2007). In England and Wales, Drakeford (1998) shows how 
prepayment meters became a widespread technology used by the newly privatised water companies in 
order to ensure revenues were protected. And Bakker (2003) embeds this 'revenue protection', and its 
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subsequent overturning, in a broader understanding of the de-regulation and re-regulation of the water 
sector in England and Wales. 
Second, UPE, drawing from Harvey’s (1982) landmark analysis of the spatio-temporalities of capital 
accumulation, has drawn attention to what Ekers and Prudham (2015) refer to as "fixed capital 
accumulation… as the physical congealment of accumulated ecologies and histories" alongside "an 
extended geography of resource flows that represent the materials that enter and exit the production 
process". Beneath the relative fixity of most infrastructural networks, urban political ecologists have 
been sensitive to the shifting historical geographies of capital accumulation which always suggest that 
permanence may only be relative. The financialisation of infrastructure can thereby be analysed 
through the changing composition of capital in a given moment and the forms of political rule that have 
sought to foster and enable such a shift (Loftus and March, 2015). An analysis predicated on such 
principles forms the basis for the approach taken forward in March and Purcell (2014) where the 
uneven geographies of financialisation are analysed across a range of different water providers, albeit 
with a primary focus on Aguas de Barcelona. In short, urban political ecologists have developed an 
approach that is geared towards understanding the changing makeup of water infrastructure in relation 
to the changing composition of capital as a social relation. 
Third, UPE has analysed the manner in which shifts in infrastructure provision are intimately tied to 
the development of distinct subjectivities. For Loftus and Lumsden (2008) Durban’s experiments in 
trisector partnerships, through which the private sector has worked with both NGOs and the municipal 
provider, are part of an attempt to cultivate a new form of responsible consumer who will enable more 
stable revenues to be captured. A purported 'culture of nonpayment' becomes the central obstacle to 
the smooth running of a commercialised service provider. Elsewhere, Hellberg (2014) has looked at the 
emerging biopolitical effects of water provision in Durban, thereby linking the emergence of neoliberal 
subjectivities to differentiated access to water, mediated through a variety of technological shifts. And 
Nash (2013) has emphasised the manner in which participatory processes enable consumers to be 
enrolled in the neoliberalisation of water. The various studies of Durban echo O’Reilly and Dhanju’s 
(2014) findings that subjectivities – in O’Reilly’s work (see also O’Reilly, 2006) gendered and caste-based 
subjectivities – become central to cost recovery principles in Rajasthan, India. In both cases, neoliberal 
authority comes to be exercised through new subjectivities that are engendered by the intersection of 
forms of rule and infrastructural arrangements. 
Exploring the emergence of these distinct subjectivities Ekers and Loftus (2008) draw on the 
tensions and resonances between Foucauldian and Gramscian approaches, claiming that the two 
thinkers provide insights into how dispersed forms of rule operate within and through the water 
network. If Foucauldian perspectives have been numerous – in particular through governmentality and 
biopolitical arguments (see Bakker, 2011) – Gramscian approaches have, more recently, gained some 
purchase in thinking through the relationship between infrastructural form and the nature of political 
rule (Loftus and Lumsden, 2008; Nash, 2013; Akhter, 2015). Gramsci appears particularly well suited to 
an UPE approach because of his nuanced development of a philosophy of praxis. Repeatedly insisting 
on the 'earthliness of thought' Gramsci’s approach builds on Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach to analyse the 
fusion of theory and practice. The simple (or often not so simple) act of ensuring a household has 
access to safe, sufficient supplies of drinking water places individuals in an active – and sensuous – 
relationship with socio-natures. Conceptions of the world emerge from, and are shaped by, this 
practical sensuous activity. For Gramsci, such conceptions are one moment within the sedimented and 
contradictory worldviews that constitute 'common sense'. Overlaid with scientific, religious and 
folkloric worldviews, common sense always contains a kernel of good sense from which an immanent 
critique might be possible. Thus, although ideology can be consolidated in a person’s material activity 
and his/her relations with forms of infrastructure, the possibility for critique is embedded within the 
very same praxis. More recently, Rehmann (2013) has placed Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis at the 
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centre of a wide-ranging survey of ideology. At the heart of Rehmann’s approach is a sensitivity to the 
concrete acts through which individuals produce and reproduce their conditions of existence. We 
would argue that such an approach should be central to an analysis of the relation between new forms 
of infrastructure, the process of financialisation, and the emergence of distinct financial subjectivities. 
First, however, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the changes implied by the term 
financialisation. 
FINANCIALISATION OF THE WATER SECTOR 
The concept of financialisation has received considerable attention from critical political economists 
and economic geographers in recent years [see, for instance, the work of Langley (2003, 2008); Aalbers 
(2008, 2015); Hall (2012) or Christophers (2013, 2014, 2015)]. Definitions vary considerably (as signalled 
in the range identified by Lee et al., 2009); indeed financialisation risks achieving the status of a 
buzzword (Christophers, 2015), including a variegated group of processes, or what Murphy (2015) 
characterises as "financialisation unlimited". Ouma (2015: 228) therefore calls for the debunking of the 
term: "so let’s get in between M and M' [referring to the lending out of money (M) for interest (M')] – 
potentially without financialisation – and make finance political in different ways". Whether the 
concept of financialisation is too broad, has been used too loosely [and therefore "hollowed out" 
(Ouma 2015: 225)], or whether it has, perhaps, lost its explanatory power (Christophers, 2015) is not 
the focus of this paper. Indeed we agree with Murphy (2015) that if the concept of neoliberalism 
implies variegated strategies, so this is also the case for financialisation. In our view, the term does have 
some validity. Indeed, over the past few decades there has been a shift in the locus of economic power, 
which has encouraged a much more speculative form of capitalism that is reliant on rent extraction and 
less obviously reliant on the creation of surplus value within the real economy (Harvey 1989, 2005; 
Foster, 2007; Lapavitsas, 2014). The range of actors involved, and the interests shaping the provision of 
a range of necessities from healthcare services to water have been profoundly altered. 
A growing body of work has therefore embarked on analysing the interlinkages between finance and 
the environment (see Liverman, 2004; Robertson, 2011; Castree and Christophers, 2015; Galaz et al., 
2015; Loftus and March, 2015), and its increasingly critical role in environmental governance, as well as 
the production of historically and geographically specific natures (Labban, 2010; Sullivan, 2013; March 
and Purcell, 2014). This body of work underscores the complex and contradictory relations between 
something so material as 'nature' and the fictitiousness of the speculative claims being made in nature’s 
name (see Labban, 2010). Knox-Hayes (2013) sees the financialisation of nature as a form of time-space 
compression, which intensifies a divorce between the use value of resources and the exchange value of 
financial instruments; this divorce, in turn, threatens the material integrity of natural ecosystems. In 
any case, the argument is that nature and the environment may influence financialisation, but, at the 
same time, financialisation shapes the production of nature. Among other dimensions, scholarship has 
focused so far on finance and climate, including fictitious commodities such as CO2 (Pellizzoni, 2011; 
Lohman, 2012; Knox-Hayes, 2013) and weather derivatives (Pike and Pollard, 2010); agriculture 
(Bracking, 2012; Ouma, 2014); timberland (Gunnoe and Gellert, 2011); energy (Fusaro and Vasey, 2006; 
Labban, 2010); nature conservation (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Sullivan, 2013); or green grabbing3 
(Fairhead et al., 2012). 
In what is referred to as the hydrosocial cycle, we can observe the creation of a complex of water-
related financial products and instruments in the past few years, ranging from water-targeted 
investment funds; to structured water products within major investment banks; water indexes; or 
                                                          
3
 Fairhead et al. (2012:237) refer to green grabbing as "the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends". 
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exchange traded funds (Bayliss, 2014, 2015). In England, the ownership of companies is increasingly in 
the hands of financial investors. The dominant ownership model in the water sector has evolved from 
holding groups listed on the stock exchange (privatisation to mid-1990s), to multinational ownership 
models (mid-1990s until 2000), to a situation where over half of the industry is now owned by private 
equity consortia (Tinson and Kenway, 2013: 6; see also March and Purcell, 2014). Ownership titles are 
traded following financial market indicators that are delinked from the real economy. At the global 
level, the prioritisation of shareholder value has had a clear impact on their geographical expansion and 
retrenchment through recent investment decisions (March and Purcell, 2014). Indeed, as Bayliss (2014: 
300) notes, "water investments have become transformed into assets that can be disposed of during 
difficult times". Water services – as opposed to water itself – therefore become tradable assets. And, as 
is argued elsewhere (Loftus and March, 2015), this process is enabled through the specific forms of 
infrastructure provision. 
If the financialisation of water has been enabled through infrastructure, over the last decade 
infrastructure has simultaneously become one of the essential sites for absorbing over-accumulated 
capital within the global economy (Harvey, 1982; Torrance, 2009). Such spatiotemporal fixes make it 
imperative to focus on the financialisation of infrastructure. In the immediate wake of the financial 
crisis, clearly recognising that investment strategies had been highly speculative and overly risky, Ouma 
notes (2014: 63) (quoting the investor Jim Rogers) that "what was suddenly in demand was less 
'financial engineering' and more 'real things'". Finance’s new love affair with real things – with built 
infrastructure and land – therefore comes at a time when, by 2030, around U$60-70 trillion will be 
needed to develop additional infrastructure (in general) capacity at the global level (Alexander, 2015). 
Some argue that, although public investment could cover US$30-35 trillion of this financial need, and 
private investment a further US$ 10-15 trillion, the remaining gap of US$15-20 trillion will need to be 
covered by institutional investors (Alexander, 2015). Along these lines O’Brien and Pike (2015) argue 
that austerity and fiscal constraints, combined with pervading systems of financialisation, have 
redefined urban infrastructure as a new asset class. Traditional sources of infrastructure financing are 
under stress, as the OECD (Della Croce and Yermo, 2013) recognises, and new institutional investors, 
such as pension funds or institutional investors, have emerged as key actors (Clark, 2001). In the case of 
the UK those actors have been rescaled and, in the process, have returned to risky, speculative, 
complex and expensive investment arrangements in urban infrastructure (notwithstanding the 
apparent move away from risk in the turn to 'real things'). There has simultaneously been a wider 
reconfiguration in that cities may source new private capital for urban development and infrastructure 
investment. Infrastructures are thus thought to generate long-term inflation-protected returns. 
Nevertheless, in the past few years there has been an emergence of innovative funding mechanisms for 
infrastructure systems, predicated upon future growth and revenue: a shift from grant-based 
mechanisms towards investment-type infrastructure projects consisting of loan-based revolving or 
recycled funds (O’Brien and Pike, 2015). UK cities have thereby been encouraged to "flirt with risky, 
complex and potentially more expensive investment activity". For Torrance (2008) this shift points to 
the apparently contradictory scalar tendencies within financialised infrastructure, relying as it does on a 
model of glocal governance in which financial instruments become increasingly globalised, at the same 
time as returns are increasingly dependent on local regulatory mechanisms. 
Far from being an abstract concern that merely affects shareholders, financialisation has therefore 
had a major impact on large infrastructural developments (Merme et al., 2014), profoundly influencing 
infrastructural developments within the hydrosocial cycle, among them, for instance, Thames Water’s 
desalination plant in London (Loftus and March, 2016). Financialisation of the hydrosocial cycle has, 
furthermore, expanded towards the household, as Allen and Pryke (2013: 419) have documented in the 
case of Thames Water, underscoring the manner in which this model is geared towards providing 
benefits to investors rather than providing for consumers' needs. Water infrastructure is thus what 
enables "the trickle-up of wealth to the richest through the consumption of water" (Bayliss, 2014: 295). 
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Crucially financialisation not only affects the supply-side infrastructure that provides water – 
providing substance to the claim that big infrastructure is back (Loftus and March, 2016) – it is also 
likely to have an influence on households through the forms of infrastructure and tariff mechanisms 
needed to generate steady returns. Indeed for several of the large water companies in the South East of 
England, water meters act as crucial mediators between large financialised infrastructure, the 
companies, and the final water user. In this sense, while in recent decades there has been an apparent 
shift away from supply-side strategies, based on the increase in water provision through large-
infrastructural solutions (e.g. dams) towards a 'twin-track approach' including demand-side 
management options (see Stephenson, 1999) based on pricing (and universal metering), both supply-
side and demand-side 'infrastructural fixes' coexist. Furthermore, both are now part of a broader web 
of financial engineering. Thus, while large infrastructural solutions are once again being rolled out [even 
dams have seen a resurgence under financialisation (Merme et al., 2014)] and a new hydraulic 
paradigm has been embarked upon in the form of desalination plants (March et al., 2014; March, 2015), 
at the same time, private companies and public water agencies have launched new demand-side 
strategies, such as universal metering programmes. Although these can be seen to have been part of a 
long-term plan on the part of both the regulator and the Conservative Party, it is only over the last 
decade that metering has really progressed. As we argue in the next section, which focuses on the 
specific case of the South East of England, the twin strategy of developing supply-side and demand-side 
infrastructures may not be as paradoxical as it might seem. Such an argument, nevertheless, needs to 
be positioned in relation to a financialisation process in which meters have become the crucial mediator 
between the political rule of finance and the emergence of new financial subjectivities in the home. 
FINANCE, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND POLITICAL RULE 
Although financial actors now play a central role in the provision of water in England, the sector 
remains tightly regulated, primarily by the economic regulator, Ofwat, whose duties are set out in 
statute (Water Industry Act, 1991; Bakker, 2003).4 Price limits are set every five years, following a price 
review process that is administered by Ofwat5 and that results in a situation where revenue streams are 
somewhat more predictable for a number of years (Bayliss, 2015). Predictability of revenues is 
increasingly important for companies, several of which are very highly geared6 (Tinson and Kenway, 
2013) and, as such, are more exposed to risks associated with revenue volatility. In a move that would 
appear to pull companies in the opposite direction, however, companies are increasingly under 
pressure to reduce abstractions and to introduce strategies for managing household water demand, 
among them metering. 
While household water metering is a common demand-management strategy in most other 
European countries, just one-third of households in England were charged for water and sewerage 
                                                          
4
 The regulatory framework in England and Wales also includes: the Environment Agency which regulates water abstraction 
and advises government on any environmental consequences that result from company practices; the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate which sets drinking water standards; and the Consumer Council for Water, which is the statutory consumer body 
for the water sector. The Scottish water sector and the system in Northern Ireland are subject to separate legal and regulatory 
frameworks. 
5
 Price limits are set for a 5-year period but companies are permitted to increase bills by inflation; the sector uses the Retail 
Price Index (RPI). 
6
 By highly geared, we mean a high debt to equity ratio within the company. Again, this shift from equity to debt as a form of 
finance has been crucial to the process referred to as financialisation within the water sector. 
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according to a metered bill in 2009 (Walker, 2009: 31).7 Historically household water bills in England 
and Wales have been calculated using a proxy for property value,8 a strategy that provided water 
companies with regular and predictable flows of revenue. Although some companies experimented 
with forms of metering in the 1980s and 1990s (Drakeford, 1998), most companies have been reticent 
to make the case for introducing credit payment meters on a universal basis. This is due, in part, to the 
capital costs associated with a metering programme and in part to the increased risk of revenue 
volatility associated with households paying for water on a volumetric basis. At the same time, the 
perverse incentives of the regulatory regime seem to provide no reward to companies for introducing 
measures that might result in their customers using less water. 
Nevertheless, growing household-demand for water, due to a combination of population growth 
and changes to the way water is used at home, has renewed the focus on demand-management 
strategies and ways to encourage households – that reportedly use 52% of the public water supply – to 
use less water (Defra, 2008: 19; 2011; Walker, 2009; Ofwat, 2011). Thus, in August 2007, the central 
government announced that companies operating in areas classified as seriously water-stressed could 
consider compulsory household metering as part of their long-term plans (Defra, 2007; see EA and 
Natural Resources Wales (2013) for more information about water stress classifications). Metering has 
become a crucial part of the dynamic in the South East of England, with three companies South East 
Water, Southern Water and Thames Water pursuing compulsory metering programmes (see table 1). 
Billing customers by volume rather than by the rateable values of properties, nevertheless, would 
appear to introduce far greater volatility within the stable revenue supply upon which financialised 
utilities depend. 
Table 1. Metering programmes in the South East of England.  
Company Supply area Meter penetration 
before commencement 
of compulsory metering 
programmes 
Metering programme 
Southern 
Water 
One million customers 
across Sussex, Kent, 
Hampshire and Isle of 
Wight 
Approximately 40% Universal Metering Programme. 
92% of households metered by 
2015 
South East 
Water (water 
only) 
2.1 million customers 
across Kent, Sussex, 
Hampshire, Berkshire  
Approximately 40% Customer Metering 
Programme. 70% households 
metered by 2015, 90% by 2020  
Thames 
Water 
14 million customers 
across London and the 
Thames Valley  
Approximately 30% Progressive Metering, 56% of 
households metered by 2020, 
near universal metering by 2030  
                                                          
7
 There is enormous regional variation in levels of meter penetration with much higher rates in the South West of England 
where water prices have been significantly higher than the rest of country; prior to 2009, Folkestone and Dover (a water only 
company) had embarked on a small-scale compulsory metering programme. 
8
 The rateable charging system was introduced in 1847 to fund large-scale sanitation improvements. The rateable value system 
contained a form of inbuilt cross-subsidy where those in more expensive homes paid higher bills. Rateable values were last 
updated in 1973, and new homes built between 1973 and 1990 were assigned a rateable value. This particular proxy for 
property value is not used to inform charging systems for any other services (Walker, 2009: 31). 
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The contradictory requirements of a stable revenue stream and the need to expand metering 
programmes can be contextualised within the political economy of water governance in the present 
moment. Although the Byzantine corporate arrangements of an entity like Thames Water makes tracing 
the origins of profits particularly difficult, it is clear that predictable revenues from households are a 
crucial link in a complex web of relationships that includes sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and 
investment banks. In spite of the complex packaging of risk, at the base of the corporate structure is the 
household. Indeed the water sector remains effectively financed by customer bills (Bayliss, 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, households have seen their bills increase faster than inflation since privatisation. 
Although Ofwat has not granted above-inflation rises in each price review, Walker (2008), in her 
government commissioned review, accepts that there has been a 42% rise in water prices in real terms. 
More recently, water companies have seen their profits rise particularly quickly in those years when 
interest rates have been low and when inflation has been higher than Ofwat assumed during its price 
determination. Although Ofwat set clear price limits, companies' revenues can vary greatly from the 
forecast amount, which, in turn, can have a substantial influence on profits. Crucially, calculating bills by 
the volume of water used, rather than by a fixed price, introduces uncertainty and less predictable 
revenue streams. Revenue shortages are therefore particularly hazardous for the most highly geared 
companies and 'under-recovery' can have serious short-term impacts on corporate credit ratings. One 
stark example can be found in the case of Southern Water, the most highly geared company in the 
sector, whose debt was downgraded by Moody’s credit rating agency to two notches above junk status 
in 2011. This was the lowest rating issued to any water and sewerage company since privatisation, 
reflecting lower-than-expected consumption levels and a subsequent revenue shortfall (Gray, 2011). 
Writing to Ofwat, Southern Water attributed some of the revenue shortfall to its Universal Metering 
Programme and a reduction in consumption associated with a period of drought (Southern Water, 
2014). 
Experiences such as those of Southern Water have been mitigated somewhat through OFWAT’s 
introduction of a Revenue Correction Mechanism (RCM) in 2008. In a clear recognition of the potential 
risk to revenues through the introduction of metering programmes, the aims of the RCM are: to 
minimise the risks of a company under- or over-recovering revenue relative to the assumptions made 
when price limits were determined; and to remove the disincentive for a company to promote water 
efficiency (Ofwat, 2008: 65-66). The first year in which a metered bill is received represents the period 
of greatest uncertainty for both households and utilities alike. Moving from a fixed charge based on 
rateable value to a charge based partly on metered consumption can mean either an increase or a 
decrease in the bill charged to households (Walker, 2009).9 After this initial year, it becomes far easier 
to predict household responses to seasonal variance as well as overall consumption. In some respects, 
the RCM can be seen as a crucial step in ensuring short-term variability in revenues is compensated for, 
enabling water companies to move towards a longer-term approach based on data-gathering and an 
ability to influence consumer behaviour. The mechanism therefore allows companies to make a case to 
Ofwat for an increase in bills in order to compensate for under-recovery, while enabling a case to be 
brought to a company should it recover more revenue than anticipated. If metering may once have 
represented a challenge to the sustainability of highly geared water companies in the financialised 
water sector, the RCM means that short-term risks of revenue volatility associated with metering – that 
Southern Water and other companies were facing – can to some extent be reduced thereby allowing 
                                                          
9
 It should be noted that each of the companies offers slightly different 'transitional' tariffs, where the proportion of the bill 
that reflects the volumetric tariff increases over a number of bill periods, sometimes years. The household initially receives a 
bill that includes an estimation of their bill on the full metered tariff. Households can choose to switch over to the metered 
tariff immediately or stay on the transitional tariff. Such transitional tariffs are a further mechanism through which companies 
avoid the uncertainty of charging through a metered system.  
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companies to continue to collect relatively stable revenues and, crucially, begin to build on a longer-
term strategy of using meters to influence individual behaviours within the home. 
In regard to this ability to influence individual behaviours, meters are important 'mediating 
technologies' (Marvin et al., 2011) and, depending on the configuration of the technology, can be used 
to restructure relationships between water users and utilities (Feenberg, 1999). Traditional "dumb" 
meters therefore enable companies to better secure the water network by more easily identifying leaks 
and tracking flows of water. However, buried in the ground outside of the home, these meters are 
largely invisible to households and have a limited influence on governing household behaviours. The 
meters that have been installed in the South East of England therefore boast additional functionalities 
and Thames, Southern and South Eastern have all opted for (slightly different) smart metering systems. 
Smart meters or, as they are sometimes termed, Intelligent Metering systems permit more detailed, 
more frequent, and more accessible data to be made available to both consumers and companies. In a 
review of Intelligent Metering programmes within urban water delivery, Boyle et al. (2013) point to the 
potential of such devices for better understanding consumption trends and for reducing demand. Citing 
early evidence from trials in Sydney, they suggest that Intelligent Metering can lead to a 7-10% 
reduction in consumer demand over and above other types of metering. The evidence for demand 
reduction from metering programmes is somewhat mixed. The government-commissioned Walker 
Review suggested a 10-15% reduction in demand through water metering. Earlier National Metering 
Trials in England suggested a reduction in consumption of 11% (Gadbury and Hall, 1989), although 
Staddon (2008) calls the longevity of these reductions into question. Where Staddon (2008) does see 
evidence of meters reducing consumption is through improved leak detection and, importantly, a 
reduction in peak demand. This reduction in peak demand – with an arguably greater influence through 
Intelligent Meters (Boyle et al., 2013) – is in part a result of the disciplining of behaviour through the 
water meter itself. While seasonal variance remains by far the greatest influence on water demand, 
reducing peak demand and ensuring more accurate predictions of future demand are crucial to the 
water companies. The relationship with the consumer is transformed in the process. Thus, in a paper in 
this journal Zetland (2016: 126) argues that "Water meters transform water users from passive 
consumers taking what (RV-funded) services they are given into active customers entitled to value for 
money" (italics in original). Recognising the important critiques of social practice theorists (Medd and 
Shove, 2005), most would acknowledge the importance of contextual factors within such a 
transformation – societal understandings of "comfort, cleanliness and convenience" (Shove, 2003) are 
crucial, for example; but the important role of the water meter in mediating the shifting political 
economy of water provision is also now widely recognised (Marvin et al., 2011). 
While enabling utilities to better track peak flow and more accurately model future demand (Parker 
and Wilby, 2013) intelligent metering also permits data to be shared more easily with consumers 
themselves, a crucial plank in the 'libertarian paternalism' that has given rise to nudge-style behavioural 
economics, inspired by Thaler and Sunstein (2009), and which has been increasingly influential in UK 
policy making in general (Jones et al., 2013). In the water sector nudge economics can be found most 
clearly in Ofwat’s 2011 paper Push, pull, nudge: how we can help customers save water, energy and 
money, which explored a range of nudging techniques, many of which were to be facilitated by the 
meter itself. Here the financial value of water is emphasised in literature pertaining to metering, and 
companies try to create a greater sense of individual responsibility by urging households to take 
'control' over their bill while altering the ways in which they use water. 
One of the ways that companies are attempting to use smart(er) meters to nudge water use 
behaviours is by changing the appearance and the information contained within metered bills. For 
instance, metered bills display consumption patterns and tips on water savings while showing 
comparisons between the billed household’s water use and that of other households, of a similar size, 
in the water company’s service area. These bills are also colour-coded, with households receiving green 
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bills if consumption is within the usual threshold and purple if consumption exceeds that threshold. 
Thus, the meter enables greater feedback to be shared with households and a purple bill provides 
"immediate recognition, like a red bill does" (Utility Week, 2011: online). Companies have also run 
extensive public education and engagement programmes in the run-up to meter installation, creating 
online portals through which consumers can monitor their household water use. Some have included a 
mandatory water efficiency audit as a part of fulfilling eligibility criteria for hardship support. Moreover, 
when households receiving meters are part of a compulsory metering programme they can choose to 
move on to a measured tariff immediately or some companies also offer a 'transitional tariff' which 
gradually moves a household from an unmeasured to measured tariff over the course of several bill 
periods. This, according to the companies, provides households with an opportunity to adjust their 
behaviours to the recently installed meter and to experiment with water efficiency strategies; it also 
means that the companies can better understand the likely impacts of any changes in consumption on 
their revenue flows before metered charging takes full effect. Meters therefore play a mediating role in 
facilitating the emergence of new financial subjectivities within the home by communicating 
companies' attempts to produce more 'responsible consumers' in a way that minimises the risks of 
revenue volatility. 
Although much of the writing on financial subjectivities (for a review, see Hall, 2012) has drawn 
attention to the new forms of risk-taking that are engendered within everyday life, it becomes clear 
from the above that the consumers of financialised services are also enrolled within the shifting 
political economy and governance arrangements implied by the term. Financialised infrastructure 
mediates these shifting arrangements and, for most households, provides a direct experience of the 
changes that come to be fetishised within what appears an unchanging infrastructural form (cf Kaika 
and Swyngendouw, 2000). Put more simply, residents of the South East of England are most likely to 
experience the financialisation of the tightly regulated water sector through their sensed and sensuous 
engagements with particular infrastructures. Although all of Thames Water’s customers will soon 
experience a dramatic increase in bills through the construction of the Thames Tideway Tunnel 
(Smithers, 2015), which, it is worth noting, is likely to become one of the most iconic of financialised 
infrastructures in the UK, it is the sudden appearance of water meters within the home (after the 
intransigence of generations of water engineers in the UK towards developing such demand-side 
technologies (McCulloch, 2009)) that provides the most direct experience of financialisation. To 
paraphrase Thames Water’s own advertising banner, it is the water meter that enables the utility to be 
"at the heart of everyday life". Thus, new subjectivities emerge in relation to the financialised water 
sector. Capillary power works to engender these new subjectivities through the infrastructure itself (for 
a much deeper discussion, which goes beyond the limits of this paper, see Nash, 2014). 
Water infrastructure, the water meter, the bill, and 'the nudge' are crucial to the emergence of 
financial subjectivities. These financial subjectivities are not characterised by new risk-taking practices 
but, instead, by the disciplined or responsible behaviours necessary to ensure a continued revenue 
stream for the financialised entities that depend on them. For urban political ecologists this poses new 
questions that go beyond the fetishisation of the infrastructural form to consider: the historical and 
geographical specificity of financialised infrastructure; the relationship between financialisation and 
infrastructural form (cf Loftus and March, 2016); and the possibility for more democratic and egalitarian 
futures that might contest the political rule of finance. In relation to the first point, we have 
demonstrated that the enthusiasm for universal water metering now characteristic of water service 
providers in the South East of England suggests that there is something historically and geographically 
specific about the emergence of water metering. Secondly, the form of that infrastructure shifts, in part 
because of the financial needs of the water service providers. This changing form is, in part, necessary 
in order to better shape the kinds of behaviours on which those entities rely – above all predictable 
consumption patterns over the longer term. If there is to be a challenge to this political rule by finance 
within the water sector, one starting point might be returning to the water infrastructure and the 
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practices through which that political rule is mediated. Indeed the immanent critique implied within 
Antonio Gramsci’s reading of common sense suggests that better understanding such practices – how 
individuals within households make sense of themselves in relation to the changing practices of 
acquiring and paying for water within a financialised sector – might provide fertile conditions of 
possibility for critical understandings of financialisation. Here, just as the subjects of the abstract world 
of clock time occasionally rebel against their alarm clocks, so the financial subjects being disciplined by 
the water meter may find new ways of struggling against their reduction to abstracted financial 
subjectivities. 
CONCLUSION 
Although it is more conventional to consider the relationship between water infrastructure and political 
rule through the grand engineering projects that have transformed watersheds (Worster, 1985), 
generated immense symbolic power for political leaders (Kaika, 2005), and woven new political 
alliances within what is often a fragmented set of interests over the appropriate uses of water 
(Swyngedouw, 2015), it is no less important to understand how infrastructure touches the lives of 
subjects through the intimacies of the home (Kaika, 2005). Social practice theorists have therefore 
sought to demonstrate how behaviours develop always in relation to forms of infrastructure. 
Subjectivities are engendered through their quotidian practices that bring networks or assemblages 
into being. For urban political ecologists there are clear political implications to such a claim. Thus, 
changing infrastructures within the home are implicated in the emergence of forms of political rule. 
New subjectivities are engendered and contested in relation to such changes. 
In England and Wales, as several authors have now noted, a profound shift has occurred in the 
manner in which water companies operate. This differs greatly from the model of privatisation initially 
embarked on in the 1980s (Allen and Pryke, 2013: 420). Heavily leveraged entities now dominate the 
sector. Indeed 
the monopoly nature of water provision and the captive income streams involved have the potential to 
deliver known rates of return over fixed time periods for investors, in agreement with the regulator, Ofwat. 
For an increasing number of highly leveraged water companies, of which Thames Water is probably the 
leading exemplar, such revenue streams are viewed more as financial assets, which, through processes like 
securitisation, are capable of generating funds that appear to have little connection to the operational side 
of the business and, we [Allen and Pryke] would argue, have more to do with a redistribution of value that 
favours investors over customer households. 
Nevertheless, if the operational side of the business appears to have a diminishing role in these newly 
financialised entities, captive income streams and known rates of return also depend on households 
acting in particular ways – consuming a known amount of water, and being receptive to being nudged 
into habits and practices that are more likely to provide the steady returns needed. The apparent shift 
in attitudes of water utilities' to metering technologies appears to have been guided in part by the need 
to ensure such behaviours are fostered. Furthermore, these practices cannot be divorced from the 
particular conceptions of the world that emerge in relation to the water sector. Building on a 
philosophy of praxis, we have called for a focus not on political rule as it is established "on the level of 
consciousness" but on the "functioning of ideological powers, apparatuses, practices and thought-
forms" (Rehman, 2013: 11). Financialised infrastructure that enters into the intimacies of the home 
assists in the transformation of the household into a human revenue stream and, at the same time, 
serves to discipline behaviours, shape practices, and foster new thought forms associated with the 
political rule of finance. Nevertheless, within such a framework we see the unceasing possibility for 
forms of resistance to develop. The entry of financialised infrastructure into the home suggests as much 
the possibility for critique as it does the possibility of a dominating and dominant form of rule to be 
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established. Thus, an Urban Political Ecology attendant to the shifting forms of infrastructure in a new 
moment of financialisation might learn from the common sense understandings that emerge, translate 
and resist the political rule of finance. In so doing, an immanent critique emerges that provides a 
slightly more hopeful set of possibilities. 
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